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Abstract 
At the time of writing, New Zealand's government is considering select committee 
recommendations to simplify the process for changing the sex recorded on a birth 
certificate (Governance and Administration Committee 2018). This article argues that 
the inconsistent requirements for binary and non-binary transgender people to amend 
their documentation indicates a scepticism of the legitimacy of non-binary identities. 
The current process for transgender people seeking to change their sex marker is 
onerous and often expensive (Noonan and Liddicoat 2008). Attaining an 
"indeterminate" marker on a birth certificate is so difficult as to be functionally 
impossible. Crown Law have suggested that “social factors” (how a person’s gender 
is perceived by others) would be considered by the courts when deciding on the 
veracity of their stated gender identity, indicating that being identifiable as a binary-
gendered person is a contributor to achieving legal recognition of one’s gender. The 
proposal presumes that recording an "official" gender is natural and necessary. Legal 
recognition of non-binary people signals an expanded understanding of recognisable 
gender identities, but requires situating oneself within a bureaucratic framework. In 
light of the new process being proposed, I argue that if passed this Bill implicitly raises 
the question of why identity documents must have a sex marker on them at all. 
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Administrative law is a key site at which the vulnerability of transgender2 populations 
is reproduced (Spade 2015, p. 89). The ability to update identity documents and other 
official records so that the information they contain is accurate and consistent has been 
identified as of critical importance to the safety and dignity of trans people (Noonan 
and Liddicoat 2008, p. 66). Inconsistent documentation (differences between the sex 
markers or names displayed on different documents, for example) or documents 
which list previous sex markers or names, restrict the ability of trans people to access 
housing, employment, social services, education, and countless other services and 
facilities without their trans status becoming known, or without being suspected of 
using fraudulent documents if their presentation and the sex listed on their documents 
are incongruous (Noonan and Liddicoat 2008, pp. 66-67). Policies which allow for 
documents to be updated only if specific and frequently expensive conditions are met 
(including accessing specific medical or surgical procedures) make updating 
documents impractical or impossible for many trans people. The necessity of legal 
representation to navigate the various processes adds to these burdens.     
 
The impact of accurate documents being difficult or expensive to access is 
greater on those who are already marginalised along other axes, such as race or class 
(Beauchamp 2019, pp. 36-49). Official identity documents are central to everyday life 
and are frequently taken as an expression of fact or proof in “naming or sexing the 
subject” (Namaste 2000, p. 260). An inability to present documents which accord with 
one’s self-identity renders one an illegitimate body, out of place. In addition to the 
practical aspects, there is also the dysphoria and stress caused by being implicitly 
viewed as an unreliable narrator of one’s own life whenever inaccurate documents 
must be presented, or when attempts to update documents are declined or made 
labyrinthine and onerous. Trans people report that successfully updating 
documentation is an affirming experience, while being unable to update identity 
documents is frustrating and can place their safety at risk (Couch et al. 2008; Noonan 
and Liddicoat 2008, p. 66).  
 
Currently in New Zealand, Section 28 of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and 
Relationship Registration Act 1995 requires trans people to apply to the Family Court to 
update the sex listed on their birth certificate. The applicant must prove to the court 
 
2 Hereafter ‘trans’.  
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that they are “not a person of the nominated sex” (emphasis mine), but that they do 
have a gender identity congruent with the nominated sex, intend to maintain it, and 
desire to have the nominated sex listed on their birth certificate (Section 28 (3)(b)). 
Additionally, applicants must provide “expert medical evidence” of their gender 
identity, and to prove that they have undergone medical treatment “usually regarded 
by medical experts as desirable” to allow them to accord with the “physical 
conformation” of a person with their gender identity (Section 28 (3)(c)). The 
Department of Internal Affairs specifically notes in their advice to people seeking to 
change the sex on their birth certificate that it is “not possible to use Section 28 to 
change the sex on the birth register from male or female to “indeterminate”” (2013, p. 
4). These requirements link the legitimacy of an individual’s gender identity to the 
medical interventions they have accessed. Obliging the applicant to prove they are not 
a person of the nominated sex (their self-identified sex) requires them to be hailed as 
their assigned sex one final time before being granted permission to change their birth 
certificate. Additionally, the inability to change a birth certificate to ‘indeterminate’ 
indicates a refusal to acknowledge the validity of genders outside of the female/male 
binary.  
 
In August 2018, a select committee report was released proposing additional 
changes be made to the Births, Deaths, Marriages and Relationship Registration Bill which 
was under consideration in New Zealand’s parliament. The bar-2 Bill proposed 
changes to the 1995 Act which would alter the process for amending the sex recorded 
on a birth certificate for adults, children, and eligible 16 and 17 year olds, as well as 
making it possible for individuals to choose to be listed simply as “parent” on their 
child’s birth certificate, a neutral alternative to being listed as “mother” or “father” 
(Governance and Administration Committee 2018). The select committee proposed 
that the current Family Court process be replaced with an administrative process, with 
the applicant making a statutory declaration directly to the Registrar General (or in 
the case of a child, their guardian making a declaration). The committee also suggested 
amending the process to allow applicants to select “X (unspecified)” or “intersex”, 
writing that this would ensure “the bill would recognise non-binary sexual and 
gender identities” (2018, p. 2). The committee wrote that the existing Act was 
“progressive in 1995 but is now outdated and inconsistent with global developments” 
and proposed “replacing the Family Court process with an administrative process 
based on self-identification” (2018, p. 2).  
 
This paper examines the current process for updating birth certificates in New 
Zealand, considering the wording of existing policy and law, the proposed changes of 
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the bar-2 Bill, and correspondence issued by the Minister for Internal Affairs and 
Crown Law regarding the select committee report and subsequent deferral of the Bill. 
The specific language of the existing Bill, the bar-2 Bill, and supplementary policy 
documents are examined: a report from the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 
writing about the legal frameworks used to establish an individual’s sex, note that 
Section 33 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 1995 clarifies that “notwithstanding 
this part of the Act [amending sex details on a birth certificate], the sex of everyone 
person shall be determined by reference to the general law of New Zealand” (2008). 
The report goes on to note that “general law” in this context is made up in part by the 
guidelines and resources produced and disseminated by the agencies responsible for 
administering and overseeing updates to legal documentation, and the decision to 
give equal consideration to guidelines issued by Government agencies is informed by 
this (2008, p. 88). Using theoretical frameworks from Bacchi, but particularly her 
“what’s the ‘problem’ represented to be?” (WPR) model, and Foucault’s work on 
explanatory or confessional discourses, as well as his theories of biopower, I argue 
that current legislative frameworks construct categories of sex3 and make some 
identities more legitimate and comprehensible than others. I focus particularly on the 
process for non-binary people and the virtual impossibility of updating a birth 
certificate to an ‘indeterminate’ sex marker. Recording the sex or gender of citizens is 
a form of enacting control and surveillance by governments, and making some sexes 
or genders inaccessible in a formal sense indicates a scepticism of their legitimacy or 
intelligibility.  
 
Both Bacchi and Fairclough situate themselves within a Foucauldian post-
structuralist framework, and Bacchi identifies how the WPR method can be applied 
to identify how policy makes and unmakes subjects and obliges those it affects to 
assume particular subject positions (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, pp. 69-71). I draw on 
Foucault for discussions of the explanatory discourses required of individuals seeking 
to update their birth certificates. Bacchi has been careful to identify that WPR is 
distinct from critical discourse analysis, and notes that this is due largely to its 
application in reflecting on what knowledges are implicit in policy (2018). The 
decision to apply some aspects of discourse analysis, using Fairclough, has been made, 
in part, because the texts being examined are not solely policy; they also include 
summaries of policy intended to be read by the affected group, correspondence from 
 
3 I say ‘sex’ rather than ‘sex and gender’ here, as many of the analysed documents suggest that gender 
identity is one factor which is weighed up when ‘proving’ sex. As discussed later in this article, policy 
documents often slide between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, but Statistics New Zealand, for example, 
seem confident that gender identity can be understood as fluid and existing across a spectrum while 
still desiring a cut-and-dried distinction between sexes.  
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official bodies, and a report into the human rights of trans people, all of which shape 
understandings of under what circumstances and by what means official 
documentation may be altered. There are, I contend, several discourses which are 
intertwined within these texts: one about the way governments (try to) define “sex” 
and their reasons for doing so, another about whose input and expertise should be 
respected in individual and policy decisions about this, a third considering the specific 
terms used within communications in policy and to affected parties. The decision to 
use both Bacchi and Fairclough has been made in order to account for the varying 
purposes and anticipated audiences of the different documents considered.  
 
Tracey Martin, the MP sponsoring the Bill, announced in February 2019 that it 
would be deferred to allow for further public consultation, drawing criticism and 
expressions of frustration from several transgender rights groups (Small 2019). A 
report from the New Zealand Human Rights Commission into the experience of 
transgender New Zealanders, To Be Who I Am, which was published in 2008 and drew 
on interviews and research conducted in 2006, identified four key policy action points 
to improve trans people’s access to rights, and their ability to participate fully and 
without discrimination in public and private life. One of these was simplifying and 
streamlining the process of updating formal identity documents, including passports 
and birth certificates, and another was ensuring that trans people were involved in the 
decision-making process regarding policies that would affect them.  
 
While the current law does not specifically require that individuals have had 
GRS/SRS4 to change their birth certificate, the Human Rights Commission found that 
this was often how it was interpreted, and that trans people had been informed GRS 
was required to update a birth certificate by staff at the Department of Internal Affairs 
or the Family Court (Noonan and Liddicoat 2008, pp. 68-69). At the time the report 
was written, the Department of Internal Affairs confirmed the Family Court had often 
interpreted the law to mean GRS was required, but added the court might approve an 
update to a birth certificate if “substantive, but not complete, surgery has taken place” 
(Noonan and Liddicoat 2008, p. 73).5 The expectation that surgical or medical 
interventions will be sought, and that movements across gender lines can only be from 
male to female or vice versa are an example of the “corporeal consequences” of 
binaristic conceptions of gender (Preves 2000, p. 43). Essentially, an assumption that 
transition is a linear process with a clearly defined “complete” end point, is embedded 
 
4 GRS/SRS refers to gender reassignment surgery/sex reassignment surgery.  
5 Given the varying surgical techniques for transmasculine people in particular, the phrasing gives 
little clarity about what constitutes a ‘complete’ GRS in the eyes of the court.   
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in the application of policy. Following Bacchi, the ‘problem’ is an incongruity between 
a body and a sex marker: the solution is to discipline corporeal forms into knowable 
models.  
 
When To Be Who I Am was published, the process for updating passports was 
significantly more onerous and many binary trans people were issued passports with 
an (X) or (-) marker in the sex field if they had not undergone genital surgery. In the 
ensuing years the process has been simplified, and the sex marker on a passport can 
now be updated by enclosing a statutory declaration confirming the individual would 
like to alter the sex listed on their passport with a new application. As of June 2019, 
the Department of Internal Affairs confirmed that there had been no passports issued 
with a (-) marker since 2005, that there were 109 valid passports with an (X) gender 
marker, and a further 105 which had expired. They indicated a reduction in the 
number issued after 2012 was likely because of the operational change to self-
identification, making a switch from one binary gender to another easier (Department 
of Internal Affairs, Personal Correspondence, 2019). This data suggests there are 
certainly people who would make use of the ability to update their birth certificate to 
indicate a sex or gender identity other than male or female if it were reasonably 
practicable, and implies the existence of number of individuals with inconsistent sex 
markers on two or more Government issued identification documents.  
 
The proposal put forward by the Governance and Administration Committee 
in their August 2018 report was for birth certificates to be updated via a self-
identification process. The current process starts from a position of requiring proof of 
what an individual claims about their own sense of self. It must be validated by an 
external site of power; one which is recognised by the courts. It also reinscribes a 
linkage between physical sex characteristics and gender identity, and the first 
requirement of the Family Court process – to prove that the applicant is a person of 
the opposite sex to their nominated sex – requires them to identify themselves in their 
assigned sex one last time before they can be granted the right to divest themselves of 
it. The self-identification process, in contrast, would make accessing accurate 
documentation easier and less stressful, as well as making non-binary identities 
literally possible in governmental terms. Earlier work has identified that non-binary 
people make up a meaningful proportion of trans populations but are 
disproportionately marginalised within an already marginal population when it 
comes to accessing accurate identity documents (Wipfler 2016; Fiani and Han 2018; 
James et al. 2016).   




While the proposal would make the process easier, it does still presume that 
recording “sex” is natural, desirable and necessary.6 The Solicitor-General, on behalf 
of Crown Law, wrote to the Department of Internal Affairs in relation to the proposed 
changes, noting that the 1995 Act and the proposed changes both made allowances for 
“general law” to ultimately determine the sex of any person in New Zealand over their 
own self-identification, but asked how this would be determined if not through 
reference to the sex recorded on a document such as a birth certificate (2019). The letter 
requested clarification on whether the Government’s intention was to maintain or 
collapse a distinction between registered sex (recorded on identity documents) and 
sex for the purposes of accessing sex-specific roles, opportunities, and obligations; this 
highlights the competing concerns with either a lack of statutory guidance or being 
“overly prescriptive” and failing to account for the wide variety of circumstances 
when an individual’s gender may need to be established (2019, p. 6). Addressing the 
breadth of situations in which guidance would be required if a distinction was 
retained, the letter noted: “a policy project to identify all settings in which a person's 
sex may need to determined, and to provide statutory guidance that is appropriate in 
those particular settings, may be a substantial undertaking” (2019, p. 6).  
 
I therefore conclude this article by exploring the necessity of recording sex or 
gender on identity documents at all, arguing that sex data is used by agencies such as 
Statistics New Zealand as a proxy for other information (for predicting population 
growth and healthcare needs, for example). Following earlier work in this area, I wish 
to note that improving the process for updating documents in the short term is a 
sensible goal to enable immediate benefits for trans populations, but the ultimate goal 
should not be finessing the state’s policing of acceptable gender identities (Wipfler 
2016, p. 494). At present trans people are often reliant on recognition from the same 
apparatuses which “functionalize gender normativities and create systemic 
exclusions” (Puar 2017, p. 35). I argue that passing the bar-2 Bill would indicate a tacit 
acknowledgement that sex or gender, while clearly important and useful categories 
for individuals, are not subject positions which have a consistent linkage to data which 
might be biopolitically useful for governmental bodies. The introduction of such a bill 
therefore inherently furthers an argument for removing sex identifiers from 
identification documents altogether: it delinks the physical form and the felt gender, 
 
6 Within Aotearoa New Zealand’s post-colonial context, it should also be noted that the insistence that 
individuals express their gender identity within prescribed terms also requires trans people to 
legitimate themselves within a system which privileges colonial ideas about gender identity 
(Kerekere, 2017, pp. 41-42; Wilton, 2018, p. 162).  
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and acknowledges that sex is something which can be declared by an individual but 




The analysis for this paper was conducted by gathering information published by 
New Zealand government agencies and statutory bodies issued by Parliamentary 
Services, and obtained via Official Information Act (OIA) requests (both those made 
by the author, and those published by relevant bodies as being in the public interest). 
The information collected included both official policy and guidance to citizens 
seeking to change the sex recorded on their official documents, but primarily their 
birth certificate and passport.  
 
The documents were then examined using elements of Bacchi’s policy-as-
discourse and WPR approaches, supported by aspects of Fairclough’s critical 
discourse analysis approach (being mindful of the distinctions Bacchi has drawn 
between these two schools). The existing legislation, the application of policy, and the 
ways that evidence or proof was conceptualised were then considered with regard 
specifically to their impact on non-binary people.  
 
Bacchi’s model examines policy as a mode of discourse. Instead of discussing 
different approaches to solving a ‘problem’, her model rather considers what the 
‘problem’ has been conceptualised to be. It also allows for an examination of how it 
has come to be a ‘problem’ which ought to be solved by government (Bletsas 2012, p. 
40). She proposes examining policy to identify what has been represented as the 
‘problem’ the policy aims to remedy, then considering what the framing reveals about 
the underlying premises which such an understanding depends on.  
“the focus is not on intentional issue manipulation or strategic framing. Instead, 
the aim is to understand policy better than policy makers by probing the 
unexamined assumptions and deep-seated conceptual logics within implicit 
problem representations. This focus means paying attention to the forms of 
knowledge that underpin public policies, such as psychological or biomedical 
premises, producing a broad conception of governing that encompasses the 
place of experts and professionals.” (2012a, p. 22)‘ 
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Bacchi’s model proposes considering what cannot be discussed under the current 
rendering of the ‘problem’, where the ‘problem’ has been produced and where it could 
then be questioned or disrupted. Bacchi also discusses how measuring tools are used 
to shape norms, then to situate people as outside them, as well as implicitly shaping 
understandings of the phenomena being measured (2012b, pp. 143, 146). In the case of 
birth certificates, the existing regulations establish a model transgender citizen and 
linear transition, what Spade identifies as the medicalised “norms of transness” (2015, 
p. 66) and Puar has theorised as “trans(homo)nationalism” (2017, p. 35). Applicants 
are then measured against their adherence or divergence from these rubrics.   
 
In examining the source texts for this analysis, I have used some elements of 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis method. I have applied his work which 
proposes considering who is permitted (or compelled) to speak, and who is spoken 
for, as well as drawing on his work which endorses considering the existing 
intertextual discourses which are present in analysed texts (1992, pp. 271-272). 
Additionally, Fairclough has mentioned the existence of “processes without agents”, 
of occurrences which “just happen” to groups, but mostly to already othered groups, 
a useful framework for some of the analysis in this paper (1995, p. 123).  
 
Bacchi also identifies that research is always a political practice, and other 
theorists have also discussed how personal relationships to the material being 
discussed will affect how it is approached and considered (Bacchi 2012b; Letherby 
2003; Ahmed 2014, p. 14). In the interests of situating myself within this research, and 
stating my relationship to the material, I first became aware of and interested in this 
issue before debates about the bar-2 Bill entered the news media, as I encountered the 
practical impossibility of updating a birth certificate to show an ‘indeterminate’ sex 
marker when attempting to correct my own. Ahmed, writing about orientations, has 
proposed the directions we take place some things, physical objects, but also objects 
of thought, within our reach, and others outside it (Ahmed 2006, pp. 552-553). Some 
of the questions which prompted the writing of this paper were within my reach 
because of directions I took, or directions I was pushed in, while trying to acquire 
consistent identity documents. When I highlight inconsistencies across policy in this 
paper, I am not writing with the intention of catching policymakers in logical failures 
as a kind of intellectual gotcha exercise. I am instead personally frustrated, and tired 
of my private medical history inadvertently being revealed whenever I produce two 
forms of identification which list me as two different sexes. 
 





Policy indications: denying bodies outside the governmental regime  
 
Bacchi’s WPR approach considers the stated aims and intentions of policy, to establish 
what ‘problem’ they intend to ‘solve’. The report from the Governance and 
Administration Committee and their recommendations for the bar-2 Bill says the 
“proposed administrative process would allow people to have greater autonomy over 
their identity and would make it easier for people to change their registered sex” 
(2018, p. 2). Crown Law’s correspondence with the Department of Internal Affairs 
notes that “Government agencies rely upon birth certificates when issuing other 
identity documents” and “[a] number of entitlements, facilities, services, roles and 
opportunities are reserved exclusively or predominantly for persons of a particular 
sex or gender” (2019, p. 2). Statistics New Zealand, in correspondence released under 
an OIA, said they “had assumed that Birth certificates would capture things like 
Biological sex rather than gender identity…Intersex is most commonly used as a 
biological sex term, rather than a gender term” (Bloomer 2018). The ‘problem’ is 
represented differently by different Governmental agencies: competing 
understandings foreground the ‘problem’ of trans people denied agency over their 
own identity; the ‘problem’ of using a birth certificate as proof of sex or gender 
identity; and the ‘problem’ of “intersex” as an identifying category being interpreted 
differently by those it may apply to and Statistics New Zealand. It is apparent that the 
‘problem’ being represented in the policy documents related to the bar-2 Bill is not 
understood to be trans people as an entire group.7 The ‘problem’ is produced as a 
governmental need to classify citizens according to their sex and gender to permit a 
secure anchorage to an unchanging identity document (Curragh and Moore 2013); the 
‘problem’ then becomes the disjuncture produced by expressions of sex and gender 
which are not clearly intelligible within a cisnormative8 and binary framework, and 
the solution is seen to be creating a series of rules and procedures to codify trans 
people within existing frameworks. The proposed bar-2 Bill would expand these 
frameworks to encompass non-binary and intersex identities, although this possibility 
 
7 I stress here I am discussing this from the perspective of official policy, procedures, documents and 
correspondence. The ‘problem’ as it is produced by trans-exclusionary feminists is very much 
transgender people as a whole, and especially the imagined threat posed by trans women being able 
to change their birth certificates through self-identification. While concerning and certainly an 
influence on policy direction, discussing this issue in detail is outside the scope of the paper. I refer to 
Phipps’ work theorising the growth of this movement for additional explanation (2019).  
8 The term ‘cisnormative’ refers to the assumption that the subject being addressed is cisgender – that 
their gender identity is congruent with their assignment sex.  
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has been flagged as a concern by Statistics New Zealand who requested the 
Department of Internal Affairs clarify if this proposed designation on birth certificates 
was intended to serve as a “biological sex” marker or to indicate “intersex” as a gender 
identity (Bloomer 2018).  
 
Further applying Bacchi’s WPR steps, the underlying pre-suppositions of this 
‘problem’ representation are that it is normal and natural to record sex on birth 
certificates, and that it is necessary for this information to be governmentally 
validated. Crown Law identify that this designation has only one direct implication: 
the sex recorded on a birth certificate dictates where an individual is placed if 
imprisoned. Using the WPR approach indicates that the ‘problem’ is how incongruous 
bodies should be classified, and, continuing to apply Bacchi’s framework, this 
‘problem’ has come to be understood as a Governmental concern through the 
unquestioned assumption that sex is a category which of course must be recorded for 
effective population-level caretaking (healthcare, for example) and control 
(incarceration). As Spade points out, the normalisation of gathering specific data 
points can function to make the categories appear apolitical, at least to those to whom 
their belonging in a category has never been called into question (2015, p. 76).  
 
Another knowledge embedded in this representation of the ‘problem’ is an 
implied or causative linkage between sex characteristics (be they physical, hormonal, 
chromosomal, or based on presentation) and gender, which can be codified and 
quantified (as discussed in more detail in the following sub-section). Also embedded 
is the expectation that sex is a characteristic which is (mostly) unchanging, or which 
can move from one discrete category to another in an orderly and linear fashion. 
Although the bar-2 Bill does not problematise all trans people, it is clearly an extension 
of the existing legislation which extends acceptability and legitimacy to binary trans 
people who have the financial means to fulfil the stringent criteria for updating a birth 
certificate.  
 
As discussed in the introduction to this article, current policies about changing 
one’s sex on a birth certificate indicate a scepticism of non-binary identities, with the 
Department of Internal Affairs noting a birth certificate cannot typically be amended 
from male or female to indeterminate (a change from indeterminate to male or female 
is possible) (Department of Internal Affairs 2013). The bar to clear in terms of evidence 
is higher than for the process of changing one’s sex marker from one binary sex to the 
other, and so specific it has only been met in one case (Department of Internal Affairs 
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2013). While it is in theory possible to change a birth certificate to ‘indeterminate’, the 
applicant must prove their sex was indeterminate at birth but was incorrectly recorded 
as male or female. The applicant’s identity must be proved via a medically sexed body. 
Intersex conditions or other indications of anything other than a binary sex 
designation which arise in later life, or could not have been detected at birth, are not 
considered sufficient proof. Under this policy, one must be born, but cannot become, 
non-binary.  
 
The requirements for changing a sex marker to a binary identity versus a non-
binary one indicates a denial of the possibility of bodies outside a governmental 
regime. The capacity exists for individuals with a birth certificate which currently lists 
them as ‘indeterminate’ to change their sex marker to male or female, or from one 
binary gender to another. The movement towards a norm is permitted, if the (difficult 
but not impossible) standards are met, but movement further from them is made 
virtually impossible in a legal sense. Even the terminology ‘indeterminate’ suggests 
the designation is a waypoint: bodies which are waiting to be assigned and have not 
yet arrived at a destination or identity. It implies subjects who are problematic by 
nature, a liminal identity category.  
 
The requirement that indeterminate bodies may only be legitimised through 
medical discourses, and that trans people generally must access treatment “regarded 
by medical experts as desirable” speaks as well to the privileging of some kinds of 
bodily alteration over others (Section 28 (3(c))). It suggests that physical characteristics 
which are either immutable (chromosomes, one of the indicators of an intersex 
identity which could have been detected at birth) or which cannot be changed without 
medical assistance will be given greater consideration in deciding an individual’s sex 
than their own claims of identity. Chromosomes cannot be altered, but they also 
cannot be discerned visually. Hormones, and the secondary sex characteristics they 
produce, can be administered without medical supervision (although typically they 
are not). Orchi- or Oophrectomies, and reassignment surgeries require engagement 
with the medical profession, or to put it another way, surgical interventions indicate 
that an individual’s sex has been judged and validated by one site of power, lending 
greater weight than self-identification. Medicine testifies to the courts as to the 
legitimacy of an identity. The locus of power to decide what sex one is, is mutable, but 
predominantly external to the individual in question under the current structure.   
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Medicalisation: varying Degrees of Proof, varied access, contingent acceptability 
 
The medicalisation of transness and trans bodies under existing legislation requires 
that trans people who wish to correct their birth certificates submit to and then 
disclose a comprehensible narrative of transition as linear and binary, moving from 
one sex to another. The explanation of oneself and one’s body required is a 
confessional discourse, in that if judged acceptable it then “produces intrinsic 
modifications in the person who articulates it” (Foucault 2008, p. 62). Even the 
proposed bar-2 Bill still compels an explicatory narrative: the self-identification 
requires a statutory declaration which expresses both the applicants nominated sex, 
and their intention to continue identifying as that sex. This is at odds with an 
understanding of gender identity as explained by Statistics New Zealand who note 
that “gender identity can change over [a] lifetime” (2015b). The language used about 
medical and surgical transition in official advisories is indicative of an expectation that 
reassignment surgery is desired and a natural end point of a transition, with Statistics 
New Zealand indicating that someone “currently undergoing” procedures allowing 
them to take “steps towards” their identified sex should be classified as that sex 
(Statistics New Zealand 2010). Although the Department of Internal Affairs identifies 
that previous rulings have acknowledged transition is never ‘complete’, they add that 
decisions about when the threshold of “permanent physical change” is reached are 
determined by medical opinion on a case-by-case basis. Leaving aside the fact that 
achieving a non-binary marker on a birth certificate is not an option, this also raises 
the possibility of pursuing permanent bodily changes to satisfy a legal framework and 
access documents which make one intelligible within a system. Or, more commonly, 
in practice they make legal recognition and the ability to live a “normal life” a privilege 
available only to those who have the means to access gender-affirming medical care, 
in addition to the desire to follow a transition path which as much as possible aligns 
them within a binaristic framework of sex and gender (Spade 2015).  
 
The language around this part of the legislation is also curious. The current 
Section 28 provisions require, in part, that expert medical opinion agrees the applicant:  
(a) Has assumed (or has always had) the gender identity of a person of the 
nominated sex; and 
(b) Has undergone such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical 
experts as desirable to enable persons of the genetic and physical conformation 
of the applicant at birth to acquire a physical conformation that accords with the 
gender identity of a person of the nominated sex; and 
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(c) Will, as a result of the medical treatment undertaken, maintain a gender 
identity of a person of the nominated sex; 
In a document providing information about declarations to the Family Court 
regarding the sex shown on birth certificates, the Department of Internal Affairs quote 
“Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2008) 27 FRNZ 58 (FC), 
which notes what is required by the wording of the current Act is that an applicant 
will prove “some degree of permanent physical change as a result of the treatment 
(including psychological treatment) received” ([50]).  
 
The implication here of the wording “as a result of the medical treatment” is of 
a causative link between medical (although in practice this has often been taken to 
mean surgical) treatment and a felt sense of gender, in that direction (Noonan and 
Liddicoat 2008, pp. 68-69). In Foucault’s phrasing, this is the utilisation of power to 
affect distribution around a norm: bodies which deviate from binaristic heuristics are 
a problem to be corrected or solved (Foucault 2008, p. 144). Crown Law’s letter to the 
Department of Internal Affairs also consults the existing case law for guidance on how 
to determine an individual’s gender if sex characteristics are incongruent (2019). 
Under this format there is no imagined situation in which a non-binary identity is the 
‘correct’ answer (all the case law referred to concerns transitioning from one binary 
identity to another), but the difficulty encountered by instruments of governmentality 
in trying to find a watertight definition is revealing. The attempts seek to draw a hard 
line where none exists.  
 
This medicalisation of bodies also ignores material realities for most trans 
people in New Zealand. Applying WPR suggests the ‘problem’ is bodies which need 
to be re-coded to be intelligible, and implicit is the assumption that trans people will 
necessarily access gender affirming healthcare. While this is publicly funded in New 
Zealand, in practice the waiting lists are so long and the services so under-resourced 
that most people self-fund some or all of their transition-related medical treatment 
(Noonan and Liddicoat 2008, pp. 52-56). Plemons has identified the issues which occur 
when plural medical and governmental systems attempt to work in concert to provide 
gender affirming healthcare, where failures to understand the multiple consecutive 
and parallel processes required often lead to delayed treatment (2019). Under this 
model, while it is frustratingly protracted, a kind of self-determination is available to 
a very few trans people – those who have the financial and other means to access 
healthcare deemed ‘appropriate’ by external powers. As Aizura points out, granting 
access to social legitimacy only to trans people who have accessed reassignment 
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surgery “forecloses the possibility that some people never wholly cross that particular 
border; or that for some, gender transition might be a lifelong project” (2007, p. 296), 
thereby structurally embedding the expectation of a linear progression of transition 
from one’s assigned gender to a recognisable and normative opposite sex.   
 
The social acceptability of trans people is often restricted only to those who can 
perform the role of “proper social subjects”, and who are able to adhere to norms in 
other ways by being economically productive, neurotypical, and willing to explain 
themselves within existing gendered frameworks (Irving 2008, p. 39). Work on 
transnormativity may be referred to here, for its identification of how engagement 
with normative “civic and economic practices” is often invoked when arguing for the 
legal recognition of some trans people (Aizura 2007, p. 299). As Spade puts it, legal 
equality for trans populations typically “opens doors… for those who are already 
closest to inclusion”, and the existing policy and application for changing birth 
certificates perpetuates this, creating a situation in which accurate documentation is 
only contingently available (2015, p. 27). 
 
Legal protections as they stand divide trans populations into deserving and 
undeserving, legitimate and illegitimate, and fail to account for, or do not care about, 
the practical barriers to accessing affirming care. Indeed, legal protections reproduce 
existing marginalisations, functionally limiting inclusion as a “proper social subject” 
to trans people willing and able to prove their adherence to norms of gendered 
presentation and behaviour, which “strive to manifest wholeness or an investment in 
the self as coherent” (Irving 2008, p. 39; Puar 2017, p. 35). The proposed bar-2 Bill 
would go some way to remedying this, acknowledging that transness is not a state 
which is conferred by accessing medical services. 
  
Punishing non-conforming bodies  
 
The existing legislation attempts to make trans people fit within a binary conception 
of sex and gender, and one in which there is a naturally occurring linkage between 
bodies and identity. The present model for changing sex on birth certificates only 
recognises the legitimacy of gender expressions which fit within an existing structure, 
and those which do not conform are punished through exclusion. As discussed earlier, 
an inability to present identity documents which have consistent and/or accurate 
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information is evidence of a failure to fully inhabit the subject position of citizen, with 
one’s identity legitimized by sites of power (Beauchamp 2019, p. 14).  
 
Research indicates that many trans people do not attempt to update their 
documents, and among those who do these attempts are often slow, invasive, and 
sometimes unsuccessful (Noonan and Liddicoat 2008, pp. 68-69, 97; Namaste 2000, pp. 
242-254, 260-261; Couch et al. 2008). The effect here is of being reminded that one is a 
body out of place, if the issue is one of failures of systems to accommodate a change 
(as in the reverting to former markers and names reported by some trans people), or 
of being judged an unreliable source of information about one’s own identity by a site 
of power. A hyperawareness of the difficulty of updating documents may be partly to 
blame for this. Foucault’s theorising of the self-surveillance and monitoring which 
results from panoptic power may be applied here as an explanation for individuals 
deciding not to attempt to update their identity documents (1995, pp. 201-203). If the 
likelihood of failure or obstruction of these attempts is well known, then it is 
unnecessary for them to be formally declined, the disciplinary power which doubts 
the veracity of their gender identity having been internalised. 
 
This self-monitoring and adherence to constructed gendered behaviours and 
presentations is the process by which the production of subjected “docile bodies” 
occurs (Foucault 1995, p. 138). A history of medical care and correct documentation 
being delivered or declined on the basis of a persuasive performance is well known 
among trans people (Serano, 2016, p. 189); so too are the risks of harassment and 
violence which come with being gender-nonconforming (Namaste, 2006). Without 
knowing when one is actively being monitored for signs of adherence or 
transgression, the safest route is to constantly monitor oneself for adherence to 
established norms of dress, presentation and behaviour.  
 
Sites of power, external loci of control 
 
Crown Law’s letter to the Department of Internal Affairs acknowledges that social 
factors, or “how society perceives the individual”, would likely be taken into account 
if a court in 2019 were to decide on the legal sex of an individual (Jagose and Perkins 
2019). This raises questions about what is left unspecified: which social group’s 
perception is being granted the status of benchmark here? A trans or non-binary 
person may be perceived very differently depending on who else is in the social group 
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and where it is. I would expect to be gendered correctly more often in a group of other 
trans and non-binary people than I would by assistants in a shop. Then again, this 
changes depending on what I am buying and where: I may be perceived differently 
in a queer bookshop than when buying milk, for example. In which social contexts is 
the perception of gender to be drawn from? The inclusion of this point, about the 
importance of societal perception, by Crown Law is a tacit acknowledgement that cis-
passing trans people are more likely to be judged to be the sex they self-identify as, 
rather than that which was assigned. It does not provide a great deal of comfort for 
people who do not pass as cisgender, or for non-binary people, who in the social 
contexts imagined and implied by this language get a raw deal. The provision of 
medical treatment to trans people on the basis of their current and presumed future 
ability to pass as cisgender has a long and unpleasant history (Wilton 2018, pp. 162-
163, 189-190; Serano 2016, p. 189). The inclusion of this point in policy draws upon a 
history of capricious provision of care, and arbitrary allocation of rights and complete 
personhood according to an external, usually cisgender, gatekeeper.  
 
In February 2019 the Minister for Internal Affairs, Tracey Martin, announced 
via press release that the Bill would be “deferred to deal with problems caused by the 
select committee process” (Martin 2019). The release noted changes to the Bill relating 
to “gender self-identification” made by the select committee had not been made with 
“adequate public consultation”, meaning “stakeholders may have missed an 
opportunity to comment” (Martin 2019). The press release goes on to say that public 
consultation for a similar bill in England and Wales was open for almost four months. 
While the submission period for the bar-2 Bill was shorter than it might otherwise 
have been had the proposed changes been introduced prior to the select committee 
process, it is clear that there was an opportunity for affected parties to share their 
views, and that a significant number of advocacy bodies did so. Trans rights 
organisations, and LGBTQI+ organisations released a joint statement in favour of the 
proposed changes, and Gender Minorities Aotearoa also circulated information about 
how to make a submission to the select committee (Scoop News 2018; Wi Hongi et al. 
2018). News media reports indicated that as debate about the Bill increased, so did 
harassment of trans and non-binary people, as well as of organisations who supported 
the proposed changes (Strongman 2019). Martin’s claim that ‘stakeholders’ had been 
denied the opportunity to comment could be argued to have a link to the “social 
factors” discussed by Crown Law, in that cisgender perceptions of a trans person’s 
gender are given weight when deciding its validity. Trans rights organisations, 
representing arguably the stakeholders most affected, did have an opportunity to 
comment. The harassment of individuals and organisations who spoke up in support 
of self-identification, coupled with the deferral to allow for further consultation, 
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implies a structural organisation of “social factors”. The perception of individual trans 
people from an unspecified public may impact their ability to update documents, and 
in Martin’s formulation of ‘stakeholders’ so too may the public perception of trans 
people as a group affect policy decisions.  
 
Beauchamp has theorised how gender nonconformity is frequently constructed 
and perceived as an implicit threat, discussing how a “broad link between gender 
nonconformity and deception manifests” including through the treatment of trans 
people who attempt to update identity documents (2019, p. 9). The monitoring of 
individuals for evidence of il/legitimacy follows a Foucauldian model: formally 
adjudicated by obvious sites of power (the courts) and assisted by monitoring from 
other members of the general population, running horizontally as well as top-down. 
Fairclough’s theorising of “processes without agents” can be applied here (1995, p. 
123). The social perspective of a trans person’s gender is clearly conveyed by 
individuals making judgements about them, but the language of ‘social factors’ 
renders these discrete judgements part of a corpus of knowledge. Other members of 
the public are ‘stakeholders’ in the legitimacy of another’s gender identity. The 
judgements of what someone’s sex ‘really’ is “just happen”, the agent behind them 




Within the analysed documents, particularly those released as debate around the bar-
2 Bill gathered momentum and as the Bill was deferred, there was an 
acknowledgement of some of the issues highlighted in To Be Who I Am: namely that 
the process for updating a birth certificate was time-consuming, stressful, financially 
onerous, and felt by many applicants to invade their privacy unnecessarily (Martin 
2019; Jagose and Perkins 2019). There was a suggestion that steps would be taken to 
“mitigate” issues relating to updating birth certificates as much as practicable.9 Many 
of the issues, however, are caused by the existing legislation and cannot be mitigated 
without the steps proposed by the bar-2 Bill. While one document, To Be Who I Am, 
does posit the possibility of removing sex markers from passports completely in 
response to the increased use of biometric data (biometric data, but particularly facial 
recognition has been criticised as a technology with potential to harm trans 
 
9 At the time of writing it had just been announced that the $95 fee to change the sex listed on a birth 
certificate would be waived (Radio New Zealand, 2019).  
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populations (Keyes 2018)), the analysed documents do not engage in any meaningful 
critique of the assumed necessity of recording sex. As Bacchi’s WPR framework makes 
clear, one of the underlying knowledges embedded in the policy is an assumption that 
naturally governments need information about the sex of citizens which is ‘accurate’ 
for their purposes.  
 
As the Crown Law letter indicates, the sex recorded on a birth certificate is 
usually but not always taken as proof of a person’s sex, but this may be superseded 
with reference to “general law”. Medical situations are often presented as an example 
of where this information is necessary, but the multiple possibilities for hormonal 
and/or surgical interventions mean that appropriate care and assessment of risk 
factors will vary between individuals anyway. Statistics New Zealand suggests that 
recording sex is necessary for projecting population growth, but the Human Rights 
Commission identified that historically the expectations for surgery in order to obtain 
an updated birth certificate rendered the applicant sterile. It seems perversely cruel to 
suggest that projecting population growth is a rationale for continuing to record this 
data, given this fact. As Spade identifies, population “care-taking” always includes a 
degree of surveillance (2015, p.75). A justification for Statistics New Zealand gathering 
data on sex then seems to be based on an assumption that sex will naturally be a core 
variable in data if it is to be usefully put to biopolitical ends.  
 
The introduction of X and Intersex markers on birth certificates would expand 
possibilities for self-identification, and introducing a simpler mode of amending 
documents based on self-identification would foreground a felt sense of gender as a 
deciding factor. Questions of how to retain the perceived integrity of sex and gender 
categories, maintaining a link of some sort between bodily characteristics and 
recorded sex are a recurring theme in policy and correspondence relating both to the 
bill as it stands, and the deferral of the bar-2 Bill. Many policy documents slip between 
referring to ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ regardless of what term is used on the documents they 
refer to (New Zealand Government 2016; New Zealand Government 2018). Statistics 
New Zealand make a clear distinction between sex and gender, and caution that 
gender is a data point which should only be gathered when it is explicitly necessary, 
but make no such caution of gathering data about sex, with the implication that 
collecting this information is unremarkable (Statistics New Zealand 2010; Statistics 
New Zealand 2015b). Spade discusses a societal tolerance of particular information 
being gathered, and the concurrent assumption that it is natural for government 
agencies to ask for certain information, with such categories taken for granted as 
“apolitical” and crisply defined truths (2015, p. 76). Existing policy approaches echo 
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this: adjustments can be made to how data is gathered or what is accepted as ‘proof’ 
of belonging, but the categories referred to remain unchanged or may be expanded 
with reference to male and female as the standards from which other identities are a 
deviation.  
 
Passing the bar-2 Bill then would constitute a tacit acknowledgement of the 
failures of existing models of defining sex and gender. Crown Law’s correspondence 
to the Department of Internal Affairs reveals the anxiety caused by this, and the 
resultant imprecision of references of “general law” in relation to deciding sex for 
specific purposes. The porous nature of categories as they stand is revealed when 
attempts are made to draw clear lines, and the implications of an ad-hoc approach to 
such distinctions is identified when Crown Law comment that it would be a 
“substantial undertaking” to identify and produce guidelines for every situation in 
which someone’s sex may need to be known, and that legal definitions of sex have 
been outstripped by social understandings (Jagose and Perkins 2019).  
 
Objections to a move to self-identification presume that trans people must trade 
their medical privacy for accurate identification, an expectation which is not applied 
to cisgender people (a cisgender woman who has had a hysterectomy, for instance, is 
not required to present a letter confirming that fact along with a psychological 
assessment of her identity to the Family Court to retain the sex marker on her birth 
certificate). New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner has additionally stated his support 
for the proposed changes, on the basis that the existing system denies trans people 
dignity and privacy (Edwards 2019). That the current mechanisms for defining sex are 
inchoate is not the fault of trans people, and nor should their ability to live a normal 
life be indefinitely paused while increasingly granular distinctions are decided upon. 
The bar-2 Bill prompts questions about the necessity of recording gender, recognising 
it as a felt sense, and potentially lays the framework for removing it from identity 
documents altogether.  
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